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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

Idaho’s Implied Consent Statute Did Not Justify the Blood Draw
Because the Trooper Lacked Reasonable Grounds to Believe
Lawrence Lutton Drove Under the Influence
The police officers who initially stopped the vehicle in Mr. Lutton was a

passenger did not conduct a DUI investigation or FSTs at the hospital because they
turned their investigation over to the ISP trooper. The trooper, on the other hand,
understood his sole purpose was to obtain the blood sample and believed other
officers had already conducted an investigation. There was no other evidence of
impairment such as bloodshot eyes, impaired memory or slurred speech. In short,
unlike cases where a driver’s admission to minimal drinking was coupled with signs
of impairment, nothing in Mr. Lutton’s presentation contradicted his statement that
he had stopped drinking more than six hours before the accident.
In Mr. Lutton’s opening brief, he argued that the officer’s detection of the
slight odor of an alcoholic beverage at the passenger window was of limited
significance, especially considering that the officers and medical personnel who
later interacted directly with Mr. Lutton noted neither an alcoholic odor nor signs of
impairment. In response, the state asserts that: “it is perfectly understandable that
Officer Anjelkovich would smell alcohol upon first contact with Lutton and Officer
Zimmer and Trooper Vance would not – because Lutton’s clothes had been removed
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and he was receiving medical treatment.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 12-13. The state’s
reasoning is incorrect for several reasons.
First, before traveling to the hospital, Mr. Lutton repeatedly dove into the
water for at least thirty minutes trying to find his young son until bystanders forced
him to stop. Exhibit A, 12:34-13:40; Tr. p. 38, ln. 24 – p. 39, ln. 7; p. 90, ln. 15-21.
Second, the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Mr. Lutton breath and pores would be
indicative of impairment, not any odor on his clothes. Finally, both city officers —
Anjelkovich and Zimmer — spent several minutes interacting with Mr. Lutton in
the treatment room before the trooper arrived. Given that neither officer, the
trooper or medical personnel noted an alcoholic odor or any sign of impairment
during their extended interactions with Mr. Lutton, the slight alcoholic odor
emanating from the vehicle is of limited significance.
The officer’s detection of a slight alcoholic odor at the passenger window, Mr.
Lutton’s indication that he had three beers more than nine hours before the
accident and his loss of control on a narrow dirt road after hitting washboard while
driving a two-wheel drive vehicle at dusk are insufficient to establish reasonable
grounds to believe Mr. Lutton was driving intoxicated. The district court erred in
denying Mr. Lutton’s motion to suppress.
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B.

Even if the BAC Request was Supported by Reasonable Grounds, Mr.
Lutton Did Not Continue to Provide Voluntary Consent to the Blood
Draw and the Search and Seizure Cannot Be Upheld Based on
Implied Consent
To be voluntary, consent based upon Idaho's implied consent statute must

overcome two hurdles: (1) drivers must give their initial consent voluntarily; and (2)
drivers must continue to give voluntary consent. State v. Charlson, 160 Idaho 610,
617, 377 P.3d 1073, 1080 (2016); State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265, 371 P.3d 316,
319 (2016). The state must prove that consent was voluntary under the totality of
the circumstances. Charlson, 160 Idaho at 617, 377 P.3d at 1080. Neither verbal nor
physical resistance is required to withdraw implied consent.” Rios, 160 Idaho 262,
371 P.3d 316.
According to the state, Mr. Lutton’s “argument that his consent was not valid
because he was not allowed to see his son is not supported by the record, because
the district court did not find his testimony on that subject credible.” Respondent’s
Brief, p. 18. However, Mr. Lutton does not challenge the district court’s credibility
finding in this appeal. Instead, the undisputed evidence — including the audio
recording and officer testimony that was credited by the district court — establish
that Mr. Lutton did not continue to provide voluntary consent at the time officers
seized his blood.
Further, the district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Lutton had to
“unequivocally” revoke implied consent and, thus, failed to apply the correct
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standard by considering whether the consent was voluntary based on the totality of
the circumstances. Applying the correct standard, whether the trooper explicitly
informed Mr. Lutton that he could not see his son until following the blood draw is
not controlling and is instead simply one circumstance in a myriad factors.
Similarly, that the officers neither handcuffed Mr. Lutton nor yelled at him
establishes that his consent was voluntary. Rather, as discussed more fully in Mr.
Lutton’s opening brief, the typical person facing the circumstances described in the

trooper’s testimony and reflected on the audio recording would have believed the
blood test was mandatory and that he could see his sons and have other visitors
after the trooper had obtained his blood.
The audio recording reviewed by the district court establishes that the
officers evicted Mr. Lutton’s visitors and informed him that he “needed” to give the
officer his blood. Exhibit A, 18:40-19:10, 22:00-22:30; see also Exhibit A, 24:20-25:00
(after officers evicted Mr. Lutton’s visitors, an employee entered the room, informed
Mr. Lutton his sister had arrived, indicated that she knew Mr. Lutton could not
have visitors at the moment and inquired whether Mr. Lutton wanted visitors once
the officers were “done”). Once the trooper arrived, the two officers positioned
themselves outside Mr. Lutton’s door. Shortly before the actual blood draw, the
trooper’s testimony was that Mr. Lutton’s gravely injured two-year-old arrived and
the trooper told Mr. Lutton he had to wait to see him. Tr. p. 23, ln. 4-24. The totality
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of the circumstances (without considering Mr. Lutton’s own testimony about what
the trooper told him) establishes that Mr. Lutton’s will was overborne and that his
consent was involuntary.
Particularly in light of Mr. Lutton’s extremely vulnerable subjective
condition, his cooperation during the blood draw does not establish voluntary
consent. The district court erred in finding that Mr. Lutton voluntarily consented to
the blood draw and in denying his motion to suppress.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in determining that the officers had reasonable
grounds to believe that Mr. Lutton had been driving under the influence. Even if
there were sufficient grounds to request a BAC test, Mr. Lutton did not continue to
voluntarily consent at the time his blood was seized. For all the reasons set forth
above and in Mr. Lutton’s opening brief, he respectfully asks this Court to vacate
the district court’s order withholding judgment and remand with instruction to
allow Mr. Lutton to withdraw his guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of October 2016.
FYFFE LAW

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
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